Cape Town divorce lawyer Bertus Preller writes South Africa’s first Book on Divorce and Separation for the general public, published by Random House Struik

CAPE TOWN, WC, SOUTH AFRICA, August 7, 2013 /EINPresswire.com/ —

Everyone’s Guide to Divorce and Separation by Bertus Preller will help with the following crucial aspects: your rights when you get divorced in South Africa, and the monetary aspects relating to divorce (including the consequences relating to assets and the divisions thereof, spousal maintenance and support, parental rights and responsibilities of children, how to implement a parenting plan, how much child maintenance will likely be required, and how to file for maintenance and child support, the procedures to obtain a protection order when there is domestic violence or abuse, an unmarried father’s rights and how to acquire parental rights and the law on cohabitation, same-sex marriages, and how to draft a proper cohabitation agreement.
In the Foreword of the book, Judge Denis Davis says the following:

“Bertus Preller has filled a very significant gap with this timely book, in that in plain language, he provides a comprehensive guide to the broader community through the thicket of law that now characterises this legal landscape. Having said that, many lawyers, particularly those who do not specialise in the field, will also find great assistance in this work. Early on in the text, Mr Preller makes a vital point – litigation is truly the option of last resort in the event of a matrimonial dispute. The adversarial process which is the manner in which law operates is not at all conducive to a settlement of issues, particularly custody of minor children, which have a long-lasting and vital impact on the lives, not only of the antagonists but also the children who have not, in any way, caused the problem giving rise to the forensic battle. Often in my experience on the Bench, I have wondered how such vicious and counter productive litigation can be allowed to continue. Lawyers will point to clients, whose disappointment in the breakdown of the marriage now powers such adverse feelings to their erstwhile partner, as the core reason for the ‘legal fight to the finish’. Whatever the context, however, it is important that arcane and often incomprehensible legal jargon be made accessible to those affected by the law. In this way, ordinary citizens can ensure that their rights work for them and at the same time they are assisted to grasp fully the implications of the obligations that the law imposes upon them. – Judge Dennis Davis”

The book is on the shelves of all major book stores on and also at Amazon.com

About the Author:

Bertus Preller is a Family and Divorce Law Attorney and Mediator at Bertus Preller & Associates Incoss in Cape Town. He acts in divorce matters across South Africa He matriculated at Grey College, studied at the University of the Free State and the University of Johannesburg and was admitted as an attorney in 1989. He has nearly 25 years of experience in law. He was appointed as a part time mediator and arbitrator in 1996 by the CCMA. He has also been quoted on Family Law issues in various newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times and magazines such as Noseweek, Keur, Living and Loving, Longevity, Woman and Home, Women’s Health, You, Huisgenoot and Fairlady and also appeared on the SABC television show, 3 Talk, Morning Live and on the 5FM Breakfast show with Gareth Cliff. His clients include artists, celebrities, sports people and high net worth individuals. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, child abduction and Hague Convention cases and domestic violence matters and international divorce law. He is also the founder of iDivorce an online uncontested divorce service.

Tel: 021 422 2461

 

Follow Bertus Preller on Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/bertuspreller
Follow Bertus Preller on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/divorceattorneys
To visit the book’s official website go to: http://www.divorcelaws.co.za

Divorce Attorney Cape Town
Bertus Preller & Associates Inc.
+27214222461

Is a husband obliged to pay maintenance when his wife lives with another man?

 

A recent judgment concerned the issue whether a husband is obliged to pay maintenance to his former wife, who is involved in a relationship with another man, after divorce. The plaintiff issued summons against the defendant, her husband, during 2003, for a decree of divorce, maintenance for herself and their son and ancillary relief.

The parties had not lived together as man and wife for a continuous period of at least two years prior to the date of the institution of the divorce action. In terms of the provision of s 4(2)(a) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (the Divorce Act), this is proof of the irretrievable break-down of the marriage. The remaining issues were whether the plaintiff is entitled to maintenance, and if so, what such maintenance should be. The defendant’s case in respect of the plaintiff’s entitlement to maintenance was that it is against public policy that a woman should be supported by two men.

The maintenance post-divorce Section 7(1) and (2) of the Act sets out when a court may order the payment of maintenance and the factors that should be taken into account when making such determination.

It provides as follows:

‘7(1) A Court granting a decree of divorce may in accordance with a written agreement between the parties make an order with regard to the division of the assets of the parties or the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other.

(2) In the absence of an order made in terms of subsection (1) with regard to the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other, the Court may, having regard to the existing or prospective means of each of the parties, their respective earning capacities, financial needs and obligations, the age of each of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce, their conduct insofar as it may be relevant to the break-down of the marriage, an order in terms of subsection (3) and any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account, make an order which the court finds just in respect of the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other for any period until the death or remarriage of the party in whose favour the order is given, whichever event may first occur.’

Through a long line of cases dealing exclusively with maintenance pendente lite, it has become customary not to award maintenance to a spouse who is living in a permanent relationship with another.

In Drummond v Drummond the Appellate Division agreed with the definition of the phrase ‘living as husband and wife’ as stated by the full bench. The parties agreed that the husband would pay maintenance towards the wife and that maintenance would ‘cease should the plaintiff prove that the defendant was living as man and wife with a third person on a permanent basis’. The said phrase has the following meaning: ‘. . . the main components of a modus vivendi akin to that of husband and wife are, firstly, living under the same roof, secondly, establishing, maintaining and contributing to a joint household, and thirdly maintaining an intimate relationship.’ The plaintiff and S clearly live together as husband and wife according to the said definition.

In Cohen v Cohen the parties determined in a deed of settlement that the maintenance payable by the plaintiff (the husband) would cease if the defendant lived with another man as husband and wife for a certain specified period. This order was varied by a maintenance court in respect of the amounts the husband had to pay towards maintenance. In the maintenance court’s order the condition in respect of the cohabitation was left out. In a subsequent action it was decided that, where the magistrate had left out the said clause, the condition was no longer enforceable as it had been substituted by the maintenance court.

In Carstens v Carstens the wife claimed maintenance pendente lite in a rule 43 application while she lived with another man as husband and wife. Mullins J found: ‘It is in my view against public policy that a woman should be entitled to claim maintenance pendente lite from her husband when she is flagrantly and deliberately living as man and wife with another man. Not only is applicant in the present case living in adultery, but she and her lover are maintaining a joint household complete with the addition of an adulterine child. She has by her conduct accepted the support of Clarkson in lieu of that of her husband. The fact that Clarkson is unable to support her to the extent that she may have been accustomed in her matrimonial home with respondent does not appear to me to affect the position.’

In SP v HP (another rule 43 application) it was found, on the strength of Carstens, that ‘(t)he objection is not so much about the moral turpitude attaching to the illicit cohabitation, but more about the notion of a woman being supported by two men at the same time’.

In the unreported judgment of Qonqo v Qonqo dealing with a rule 43 application for maintenance pendente lite, the court, in spite of the fact that the applicant cohabited with her lover, ordered the respondent to pay maintenance pendente lite. The reason for ordering the payment of maintenance was that there was no proof that the lover supported the applicant in that instance.

It is also clear from the wording of s 7(2) of the Divorce Act that the legislature did not determine that maintenance should cease when the person receiving the maintenance is in a relationship akin to a marriage but only on remarriage. It is usually by way of an agreement between the parties that the additional condition relating to the cessation of payment of maintenance on the cohabitation with a third party is added.

Marriage entails that the parties establish and ‘maintain an intimate relationship for the rest of their lives which they acknowledge obliges them to support one another, to live together and to be faithful to one another’. One of the effects of marriage is the reciprocal duty of support. This duty of support does not exist, in circumstances such as these, if there is no marriage.

In Volks NO v Robinson and Others the proceedings had been initiated by Mrs Robinson who had been a partner in a permanent life partnership with Mr Shandling for a period of 16 years until his death in 2001. The couple had not been married, although there was no legal obstacle to their marriage. Following the death of Shandling, Robinson submitted a claim for maintenance against his deceased estate. The executor of the estate, Volks, rejected her claim because she was not ‘a survivor’ as contemplated by the Act. Skweyiya J said at paras 55 – 56: ‘Mrs Robinson never married the late Mr Shandling. There is a fundamental difference between her position and spouses or survivors who are predeceased by their husbands. Her relationship with Mr Shandling is one in which each was free to continue or not, and from which each was free to withdraw at will, without obligation and without legal or other formalities. There are a wide range of legal privileges and obligations that are triggered by the contract of marriage. In a marriage the spouse’s rights are largely fixed by law and not by agreement, unlike in the case of parties who cohabit without being married. The distinction between married and unmarried people cannot be said to be unfair when considered in the larger context of the rights and obligations uniquely attached to marriage. Whilst there is a reciprocal duty of support between married persons, no duty of support arises by operation of law in the case of unmarried cohabitants. The maintenance benefit in section 2(1) of the Act falls within the scope of the maintenance support obligation attached to marriage. The Act applies to persons in respect of whom the deceased person (spouse) would have remained legally liable for maintenance, by operation of law, had he or she not died.’

If regard is had to the decision of Cohen, that it cannot be read into s 7(2) of the Act that the maintenance will cease when the recipient of the maintenance lives as husband and wife with another, as an express agreement to that effect can be amended by the maintenance court. Having regard to the factors that should be taken into account when determining whether the defendant ought to pay maintenance for the plaintiff, in terms of s 7(2) of the Act, the factors mentioned are not exclusive.

When taking into consideration the factors mentioned in s 7(2) of the Act to determine whether the defendant is liable to pay maintenance the following emerge:

(a) The existing and prospective means of each of the parties and the parties’ respective earning capacities.

(b) The financial needs and obligations of the parties. It is clear that neither of the parties can live lavishly, but they are not destitute.

(c) The age of the parties.

(d) The duration of the marriage.

(e) The standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce.

(f) The conduct of the defendant insofar as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the marriage.

The facts of this matter differed materially from Carstens; SP v HP; and Qonqo. It is immaterial whether the defendant was unable to support the plaintiff and their son, or whether he was merely unwilling to do so. Other legislation also makes it clear that the legislature envisaged that a man can be supported by two women. In terms of the provisions s 8(4) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, a court dissolving a customary marriage has the powers contemplated in ss 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. This has the effect that with polygamous customary marriages a husband will have the right to be supported by more than one wife, post-divorce, if circumstances demand it. Although it might have been a concept that was unacceptable in a previous dispensation, the concept is not unacceptable today. The court was of of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case it could not be said that it is against public policy that the defendant should be liable to pay maintenance to the plaintiff; there is no legislative prohibition and the court found that there was no general public policy to that effect or moral prohibition.

Divorce Settlement Agreements – can they be varied without a formal court application?

It happens frequently that the circumstances change years after a divorce Settlement Agreement was concluded. For example, as in the case of GF v SH and Others 2011 (3) SA 25 (GNP). In this case, the ex  husband and ex wife agreed amongst themselves with the intervention of a mediator that their children would spend more time at the ex husband’s house and adopted a shared parenting approach. Necessarily the new arrangement had a bearing on the maintenance that the ex husband paid to his ex wife for the children as the children spent more time in the ex husband’s care. The mediated agreement was never signed between the parties, or the original Settlement Agreement varied, but the ex husband paid the reduced maintenance. After some time the wife, probably acting out of scorn issued a warrant of execution for the non payment of maintenance as per the original court order. The facts appear below.

In terms of the settlement agreement custody of the minor children was awarded to the wife, subject to the applicant’s reasonable rights of access. In addition the settlement agreement provided that the applicant was to pay maintenance at the rate of R5000 per month per child, escalating annually at the consumer price index rate. In addition the applicant was to pay for all the educational and medical expenses incurred in respect of the minor children.

Following the divorce, the parties appeared to have had ongoing problems and disputes that related to the payment of maintenance, timeousness and the adequacy of such payments, as well as issues relevant to the parenting of the children, including decisions related to their upbringing and well being.

On 15 April 2010 the wife caused a warrant of execution in the sum of R303 154,62, plus interest and costs, to be issued at court for arrear maintenance and non-compliance with their divorce order. Following the issuing of the warrant the wife attached certain goods from the home of the ex husband and belonging to him.

The ex husband’s case was based on the fact that changes were made by himself and the wife to the residency arrangements in respect of the minor children, which changes became operative from March 2008 until about June 2009 and as such his liability to pay the maintenance provided for in the court order of 27 August 2002 had been varied by agreement between himself and the wife. He further contended that, in terms of the change of residency arrangements reached in March 2008, the parties agreed to have the minor children with them for alternate weeks. In addition there was a further mediated agreement with regard to a new payment regime, insofar as it related to the payment of maintenance, in terms of which regime the applicant would not be required to pay any maintenance directly to the wife, but instead would cover all expenses incurred in respect of the maintenance of the minor children and make such payments directly to third parties or, in appropriate instances, to service providers and the children. In this regard it appeared that the parties were assisted by one Charles Cohen, a mediator with expertise in the area of family law.

The wife’s contention was that even though there may have been changes to the residency arrangements insofar as these related to the minor children, it did not absolve the husband from complying with the express provisions of the court order and settlement agreement of 27 August 2002 relating to maintenance payments. In this regard it was the wife’s stance that since the written agreement of settlement provided that ‘save for the above, the provisions of this agreement shall not be capable of being varied (save by a court of competent jurisdiction), amended, added to, supplemented, novated or cancelled unless this is contained in writing and signed by both parties’, any oral or informal arrangement was of no force or effect and not binding on the parties. Alternatively the wife contended that even if there was a variation, it only applied in respect of a trial period from August 2008 to November 2008, and that at best her ex husband would be absolved from paying maintenance for three months (August 2008 to October 2008), and the warrant of execution, if incorrectly issued, was incorrect to that extent, and that extent only.

The agreement was never signed by the parties and the question that the court had to pronounce was whether a Settlement Agreement in a divorce action could be varied by mutual agreement, without resorting to court to vary the Agreement formally.

The principle of non-variation of a written agreement in the context of a non-variation-except-in-writing clause was firmly established in the matter of Shifren and Others v SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk 1964 (2) SA 343 (O). The stance, which essentially proceeds from the premise that any attempt to agree informally to vary a contract containing a non-variation clause, except in writing, must fail, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drostky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) (2002 (12) BCLR 1229; [2002] 3 All SA 363). The court however found that there must be instances where public policy may justify a departure from the Shifren principle in the area of family law. Without suggesting that such departure should be easily justified or readily countenanced, there must be due regard to the context within which parenting takes place, and within which decisions that may on the face of it vary an express obligation, are arrived at to attain some other socially desirable objective — the best interests of the child. In all the circumstances the demands and the consideration of public policy, in the context of ensuring the development of family law, that are consistent with the values of the Constitution, including the values of equality and non-discrimination, as well as ensuring the advancement of the best interests of the child, would in the court’s view, in appropriate instances and where a proper case is made out, certainly justify a departure from what has become known as the Shifren principle.

The court further noted that if indeed the Shifren principle were entrenched and did not apply in the context of family law, it may well have the effect of achieving all kinds of unintended consequences that may well militate against the development of a public policy consistent with the norms and values of our Constitution. In particular, a strict adherence to those principles may well mean that parents become saddled with a disproportionate share of their responsibility in respect of the maintenance and upbringing of a minor child. It may well have the effect of restricting the ability of parents to do that which the best interests of the child demand, as opposed to that which they are obliged to do in terms of an agreement of settlement, which terms and provisions may well not have kept in touch with the changing times and developments relevant to the context.

From the above it is clear that a Settlement Agreement in a divorce, that was not varied by a formal application to court, may be varied by agreement between the parties, without formally applying to the court to vary such order. It is however of utmost importance that agreements that vary an existing Settlement Agreement be reduced to writing and signed by both parties.

About the Author

Bertus Preller is a Divorce and Family Law Attorney in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in most sectors of the law and 13 years as a practicing attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters, international divorce law, digital rights, media law and criminal law.

Cohabitation and Living Together

Gone are the days of “single” or “married”. You only have to look at Facebook’s relationship declaration options to know that today’s partnerships come in all shapes and sizes. But what are the financial risks of being involved in a long-term relationship that is not formally recognized as a marriage?

Patterns of marriage, divorce and cohabiting without marriage had been changing for years. The incidences of domestic partnerships are growing throughout the world, according to the 1996 census, 1.3million people described themselves as living with a partner. When the 2001 census came around, this figure had almost doubled to nearly 2.4million. Many people believe that, if they live together for some time, the relationship will be recognized by the state, and there will be legal rights, duties and protection. But there was no such thing as common-law marriage – because the concept has been abolished worldwide. The time a couple spend living together does not translate into a default marriage. The consequence is that, at the dissolution of the relationship, the assets or any obligations are determined or distributed on a basis of the arrangement that parties used during their relationship.

Domestic partnerships were never prohibited in South African law – but neither did they enjoy any noteworthy recognition or protection. In SA, marriage laws traditionally provided parties with a variety of legal protections. These laws governed what happened to the property of the parties during the marriage and on dissolution, either by divorce or death, and also meant that certain benefits were automatically acquired, such as membership of medical aid funds, pension funds, etc. Married spouses also had a reciprocal duty of support under the common law. South African courts had occasionally helped couples by deciding that an express or implied universal partnership existed, but this was usually difficult to prove. The only way to be protected in our law is to enter into a cohabitation agreement. Such an agreement clarifies the expectations of the partners and also serves as an early warning of future problems.

A cohabitation agreement will determine what would happen to the property and assets of the couple if they should decide to separate. The agreement is, however, not enforceable in so far as third parties are concerned.

However, in terms of the 2005 Children’s Act, the parents of children born out of wedlock had a duty to maintain their offspring, irrespective of the living arrangements. Basically a cohabitation agreement regulates rights and duties between the partners. It could almost be compared to an antenuptial contract entered into prior to the conclusion of a civil marriage. The agreement can provide for the division and distribution of assets upon dissolution: for instance, the formal agreement may set out the rights and obligations towards each other; the respective financial contributions to the joint home; clarify arrangements regarding ownership of property that they may purchase jointly and the division of their jointly owned assets should they separate.

An agreement such as this will be legally binding as long as it contains no provisions that are immoral or illegal. If there is no agreement on the dissolution of a domestic partnership agreement, a party would only be entitled to retain those assets which he or she has purchased and owns and further would be entitled to share in the assets proportionately in terms of the contribution which they have made to the partnership. However, problems arose if a partner tried to enforce a domestic partnership agreement if the partner being sued was married to someone else. It has been argued that in such cases domestic partnership agreements violate public policy to the extent that they impair the community of property rights (where applicable) of the lawful married spouse.

The Domestic Partnerships Bill was still being formulated, and it wasn’t clear how it would be implemented. In the current constitutional dispensation it is unlikely that a partner will be left in despair, taking into account the Domestic Partnerships Bill. My advice would be for cohabiting couples to enter into a contract – a written partnership agreement that states exactly what will happen in the event of death or a split, protecting their rights and outlining their obligations. For example, when it comes to the ownership of property, the contract should state what happens to ownership of the property (such as one spouse buying out the other) or payments in the event of death or a split. Putting any relationship into writing is always helpful, even if it’s just adding someone on your medical aid as a dependant. “Having said that, in the event of death, having a will is always the best idea. Out of the bounds of a legally recognised marriage there is no intestate succession – meaning there is no automatic participation in the estate to make sure the other partner is looked after. Joint accounts never a good idea Money is one of the most important matters a couple needs to resolve when contemplating living together or marriage. One issue that often comes up in these kinds of discussions is whether to have a joint bank account. In many ways, this can seem like an appealing option. However, most financial experts don’t recommend having a joint account at all.

One never encourage a joint account because whether you are married or living together, you both need to grow your assets and get a good credit rating. Having a joint account invariably makes it difficult for one of the partners to do so. Besides, a joint bank account puts one partner at great risk in the event of a break-up, death or financial difficulties. There is no joint bank account with two equal account holders. A ‘joint’ account is actually an account in one person’s name, to which the other person is a signatory. This causes a number of complications for that signatory. The most important of these is that without a bank account in your name, you will have no credit record at the bank – which makes it difficult to get credit at shops, open a cellphone account or apply for a loan. In the event of a break-up, the joint account could be emptied by one partner or the person in whose name the bank account is held could remove the second signatory. If one partner dies, banks tend to freeze the account until the estate is resolved – leaving the signatory partner with no access to the funds for an extended time. One should advise couples to split responsibility for monthly expenses, or open an account for the household into which both pay a portion of their salaries for general expenses.

Who gets your pension? There are typically two types of benefits payable to “spouses”. Firstly pensions, which are payable to those who qualify as spouses – and that would depend on how each fund defines an ‘eligible spouse’: people must check the fund rules to see if their partner/spouse would qualify. Fund rules may stipulate that you must be married to the same person at date of retirement and date of death for them to qualify for a spouse’s pension. This prevents so-called ‘death-bed marriages’ where a pensioner marries someone much younger than them after they have already retired – and on their death the fund realises that there is a much younger spouse to whom they have a liability to pay a pension for many years.

The second benefit type is the typical fund benefit (fund credit or share of fund) plus an insured multiple of a salary (three times annual salary, for example). This is allocated by the trustees, to your dependants and nominees. A dependant includes a spouse; the Pension Funds Act defines a spouse as a person who is the permanent life partner or spouse or civil union partner of a member in accordance with the Marriage Act, Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, Civil Union Act or the tenets of a religion. A very wide definition. To ensure that no partner is overlooked, the pension fund member should always nominate a beneficiary in the relevant form to help the trustees – although trustees are not absolutely bound to follow that nomination. Unfortunately, when it comes to death and money such decisions by fund trustees are often contested.

Here is a very basic Cohabitation Agreement:

Cohabitation Agreement

The following form is intended for illustrative purposes only. You and your attorney can use this sample as a guide in drafting a cohabitation agreement that best protects your interests and complies with the laws in effect where you live.

Why do I need a Cohabitation Agreement?

A Cohabitation Agreement sets out the financial terms of a couple’s relationship, and provides protection for the parties upon death, or should the relationship fail. 

Who should use a Cohabitation Agreement?

Any unmarried couple in a relationship and living with each other could find this agreement useful.

Also known as:

  • Conditions of Cohabitation
  • Cohabitation Contract

It is advisable that you contact an attorney in regard to drafting such an agreement.

COHABITATION AGREEMENT

Between

(The 1st Party)

and

(The 2nd Party)

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS

1.  The parties are currently living together in a domestic partnership and intend to continue living together in this arrangement;

2.  The parties wish to define their respective proprietary rights and liabilities arising from their domestic partnership arrangement;

3.  The parties each acknowledge that they enter into this agreement voluntarily, without any duress or undue influence, and that each has had the opportunity to consult with an attorney of his/her choice;

 

 

THE PARTIES AGREE:

 

1.         Marital Status

The joint residency of the parties shall in no way render the parties married in any way, whether by operation of common law or any other law.

2.         The Agreement

2.1       This Agreement consists solely of the mutual promises contained herein and the mutual promises of each party to act as the living companion and partner to the other.

2.2       This Agreement fully contemplates and compensates any and all services provided by either party for the benefit of the other during the course of their joint residency. The furnishing of sexual services shall in no way be construed as consideration for this Agreement.

3.         Disclosure of Current Financial Status

Each party has fully and completely, to the best of his/her knowledge, disclosed to the other party his/her current financial condition including all assets and liabilities. Each party has attached a balance sheet to this agreement indicating his/her current assets and liabilities with the understanding that this balance sheet reflects his/her current financial status to the best of his/her ability.

4.         Division of Living Expenses

Necessary and jointly approved living expenses shall be divided between the parties as below:

4.1       The 1st Party shall contribute _____________ percent ( ____%) per month;

4.2       The 2nd Party shall contribute _____________ percent ( ____%) per month.

The parties shall contribute their monthly pro rata contributions into the joint savings/current account of the parties. Any property purchased using funds in this account shall be considered to be the joint property of the parties and owned according to the respective party’s percentage of contribution as stated above. Either party may draw upon this checking account.

5.         Separate Property

The following properties shall be kept by the parties as the separate property of the recipient and the said properties shall not be subject to division at the termination of this Agreement:

5.1       All and any property, real or personal, owned by a specific party at the date of execution of this Agreement;

5.2       Individual gifts, bequests or inheritances acquired before or after the execution of this Agreement;

5.3       Individual earnings, salary or wages acquired before or after the execution of this Agreement;

5.4       All income or proceeds derived from the aforementioned properties.

6.         Commingling of Property

All commingled property shall be presumed to be joint property of the parties unless otherwise agreed.

7.         Joint Property

All property acquired by the parties after the date of execution of this Agreement and before the termination of this Agreement and procured jointly with joint resources and funds shall be considered joint property of the parties with each party possessing his/her aforementioned percentage of ownership.

8.         Division of Property upon Termination

Upon termination of this Agreement or termination of the joint residency, all jointly owned property shall be divided among the parties according to their pro rata share listed above.  If the parties are unable to agree on the appropriate division of joint property, they may appoint an independent and mutually agreed upon Third-party to act as Appraiser.  The Appraiser shall divide the property among the parties according to his/her pro rata share.

9.         Duty of Good Faith and Confidentiality

9.1       This Agreement creates a fiduciary relationship between the parties in which each party agrees to act with the utmost of good faith and fair dealing toward the other in the management of their joint property and in all other aspects of this Agreement.

9.2       Without obtaining a parties’ written consent in advance, a party shall not directly or indirectly publish, or cause to be published, any diary, memoir, letter, story, photograph, interview, article, essay, account, or description or depiction of any kind whatsoever, whether fictionalised or not, concerning the relationship or any other aspect of a parties’ personal, business or financial affairs, or assist or provide information to others in connection with the publication or dissemination of any such material or excerpts thereof.

10.       Legal Names of Parties

Each party shall retain his/her legal name, including surname, as printed and signed in this Agreement.

 

11.       Duration of Agreement

This Agreement shall become effective at the date of execution and shall remain in effect until termination. Termination shall be effected by written notice by either party, cessation of the joint residency by either party or death of either party.  Either party may terminate this Agreement unilaterally at any time.

12.       Death of Party

Upon the death of either party, the surviving party waives all rights to support by the deceased party.

13.       Complete Agreement

It is the intent of the parties that this Agreement be the full and complete agreement between the parties regarding their joint residency.  No variation of this agreement shall be of force or effect unless reduced to writing and signed by both parties.

14.       Severability of Provisions

Should any paragraph or provision of this Agreement be held invalid, void, or otherwise unenforceable, it is the intent of the parties that the remaining portions shall nevertheless continue in full force and effect without impairment.

15.       Governing Law

This Agreement shall be governed by, interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South Africa.

DATED at                                     this                  day of                                    201_

AS WITNESSES:

 

1.

 

2.

 

DATED at                                     this                  day of                                    201_

AS WITNESSES:

 

1.

 

2.

About the author:

Bertus Preller is a Divorce and Family Law Attorney in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in most sectors of the law and 13 years as a practicing attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters, international divorce law, digital rights, media law and criminal law.

Email: info@divorceattorney.co.za

Seven Big Post-Divorce Money Mistakes Women Make

The Seven Big Post-Divorce Money Mistakes Women Make

Breaking up is not only hard to do, it can be brutal on your finances.

Legal fees and creating and running two households from one are just the initial costs of separation process. And while some expenditure is necessary, others can be emotionally charged and careless and can lead to serious debt.

Here are seven common ways divorced couples can get into big financial trouble after a split:

1.            Ignorance

While a divorce Settlement Agreement may specify who is to pay what account, it carries little weight with creditors.

The most frequent mistake of all after divorce is assuming that because the ex spouse has been the one ordered to pay back the debt in the divorce, they are off the hook for it.  Most people do not realise that courts do not have the authority to make creditors abide by a judge’s orders in divorce. A spouse may have recourse to re-claim a debt from the other spouse who assumed the debt, but it does not nullify liability towards the creditor where the debt was a joint debt of the parties.

2.         Delusion

If you relied on the other person’s income during the marriage, your cash flow may take a serious dip. As it constricts, so must your budget. Unfortunately, many who are accustomed to abundance deny reality and continue to shop till they drop. The bills, however, wind up on the cards.

The most important thing most parents want is for their child’s lifestyle to continue, be conscious of your current circumstances and spend accordingly.

3.         Neglect

Own a home together? Make sure that your share in the property is transferred, especially if you are married in community of property. There are many cases where one party was awarded the other spouse’s share in the home, but neglected to transfer it. If your ex lands in financial trouble after divorce, creditors may still attach his/her share in the property, so make sure it is transferred.

4.         Revenge.

Wanting to ruin your ex by charging up the cards is a frequent response to betrayal; it is what one call ‘the saboteur spouse’. Squelch this desire, though. While big balances may result in the hoped-for fury, you too could be held responsible for the balance.

5.         Beauty

If you’ve been dumped for a younger model and want to make yourself feel better by looking better with the hope of attracting a new mate, you may be considering splurging on a beautification procedure.

Be careful, though it usually translates into little more than added liabilities. Some people spend thousands on plastic surgery after discovering the husband’s affair. It may be money that one could not afford to spend, it was more important to paying off credit cards. Worse, those nips and tucks normally has no positive impact on the soon-to-be ex. Delay any major decisions — financial and cosmetic — for at least six months to a year after a divorce is finalized.

6.         Competition

What happens when one parent can afford more and better things for the children post-separation? The less wealthy partner sometimes attempts to keep up with or even outdo the other.

Oftentimes, there is a pre-divorce battle for the children’s love and affection by purchasing gifts for kids or taking them to concerts or cruises in order to gain their affection over the other spouse. Question your motivation for purchasing certain items for the kids. If it’s to prove your love, stash the cards.

7.         New love

Getting sucked into a fresh romance when a marriage falls apart can be seductive. It can also be pricey. One of the most common post-divorce credit issues are loans people make for new partners. In some cases, it may be thousands to fix a broken car, but in others, it is tens of thousands to help a new lover with a business, or hundreds of thousands to put towards an ‘investment’ that was really a scam. Avoid lending or giving money to anyone for at least a year after divorce.

Almost everyone has regrets about a broken relationship. Don’t make needless, emotion-based liabilities one of them. Divorce your mate, not common sense.

About the author:

Bertus Preller is a Divorce and Family Law Attorney based in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in most sectors of the law and 13 years as a practicing attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. and litigates in divorce matters across the country. He is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times. His clients include celebrities, actors and actresses, sportsmen and sportswomen, television presenters and various high net worth individuals.  His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, International Divorce Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters, digital rights, media law and criminal law.

Bertus other passion is technology and he also co-pioneered the development of technology in which the first book in the world was delivered to a mobile phone utilizing sms and java technology and also advised a number of South African book publishers on the Google Book settlement class action and negotiated contracts with the likes of Google and Amazon.com.

Divorce Attorney now also consulting in Stellenbosch

Bertus Preller a specialist Divorce and Family Law Attorney at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town, will now be consulting on a weekly basis in Stellenbosch. Due to demand from clients in the Stellenbosch, Paarl and Somerset West areas, Bertus will be consulting once a week in Stellenbosch on divorce and family law matters.

Bertus is the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times. He has handled numerous high profile divorce matters of sportsmen, celebrities, actors and high net worth individuals. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters, international divorce law, digital rights, media law and criminal law.

Bertus matriculated at Grey College in Bloemfontein and graduated from the University of the Orange Free State in 1988 (cum laude – Criminal Procedure) and followed this up with post graduate studies at the University of Johannesburg, he articled at Symington & De Kok Attorneys in Bloemfontein.

For further enquiries contact:

Melanie Radcliffe on 021 422 13232 or email info@divorceattorney.co.za

Shared Parenting

What is Shared Parenting?

“An arrangement whereby children freely enjoy the love and nurture of both parents and their wider family following separation or divorce …it does mean that sufficient time is spent with each parent for the child to view each parent as a parent rather than an aunty or uncle.”

(ASP definition of Shared Parenting as adopted by CAFCASS in 2004)

Shared parenting is an arrangement after divorce wherein both parents continue to have a strong positive presence in their children’s lives. Shared parenting entails that a child spend equal or significant amounts of time with each parent.

As a divorce and family law attorney I see a huge shift towards a more collaborative approach between parents to share equal time with their children after divorce.

Shared parenting arrangements may differ to suit various situations. Time between each parent may be split 50/50 or the children may live with one parent for example, four days every week and the rest of the week with another parent.

After divorce, shared parenting is a preferred alternative to asking the children to choose where they want to live. Many children prefer shared parenting rather than the traditional arrangements. With shared parenting, the children still has the chance to have a meaningful relationship with both of their parents.

There are many benefits to shared parenting. It allows a child to have both his/her parents present in his/her life and although the child has to switch between two homes, shared parenting reassures the child that both parents care for them. This arrangement is more beneficial to a child than when they live with only one parent because often the latter creates a distance both physical and emotional between the child and the “absent” parent.

Studies show that children of divorced couples who retain meaningful relationships with each parent are the ones who find it easier to deal with the breakup of their parents. Research also shows shared parenting is possible despite intense conflict between parents if the parents focus on what is best for their children.

Almost half of the children in the U.S. are deprived of the lifelong benefits of two parents who share the parenting throughout the first 18 years of their children’s lives.

The Benefits of Shared Residence and Shared Parenting

  • Removes the need for a child to choose between the parents
  • Allows both parents to love and nurture the child in much the same way as they did prior to parental separation and therefore promotes the continuation of family life
  • The child does not feel rejected by the non-resident parent and does not blame himself
  • Confirms to the child that he still has two parents who love and wish to care for him
  • The child derives emotional and psychological security from having two fully engaged parents
  • The child is no longer brought up to believe that the resident parent is the real, better or main parent and that the non-resident parent is a lesser parent or to be rejected
  • Re-affirms the responsibility of each parent to care and provide for the child
  • Sends a clear message to the resident parent, schools, doctors and the courts that both parents are equal and that all decisions relating to the child should be based on this principle
  • The child is more likely to grow up in a well-adjusted manner
  • Reduces parental hostility as it requires both parents to negotiate and make joint decisions

Bertus Preller is a Divorce and Family Law Attorney in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in most sectors of the law and 13 years as a practicing attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters, international divorce law, digital rights, media law and criminal law.

Bertus Preller

B.Proc; AD Dip L Law

Family Law Attorney

A:1st Floor, 56 Shortmarket Street, Cape Town, 8000

O: +27 (0) 21 422 1323

F: 086 572 8373

C: +27 (0) 83 443 9838

E: bertus@divorceattorney.co.za; W:  www.divorceattorney.co.za; Twitter: www.twitter.com/edivorce;

Facebook: www.facebook.com/divorceattorneys; Skype: divorceattorney

Living together, make sure you have a cohabitation agreement, otherwise you leave with nothing!

Personal finance: If you don’t say ‘I do”, get it in writing – Interview with Bertus Preller – Family Law Attorney

Gone are the days of “single” or “married”. You only have to look at Facebook’s relationship declaration options to know that today’s partnerships come in all shapes and sizes.

But what are the financial risks of being involved in a long-term relationship that is not formally recognised as a marriage?

We quizzed some experts to find out the best ways to protect yourself if you don’t fancy walking down the aisle with your life partner.

Family law attorney Bertus Preller said patterns of marriage, divorce and cohabiting without marriage had been changing for years.

“The incidences of domestic partnerships are growing throughout the world.”

Preller said that, according to the 1996 census, 1.3million people described themselves as living with a partner. When the 2001 census came around, this figure had almost doubled to nearly 2.4million.

Many people believe that, if they live together for some time, the relationship will be recognised by the state, and there will be legal rights, duties and protection.

But Preller said there was no such thing as common-law marriage – because the concept has been abolished worldwide.

“The time a couple spend living together does not translate into a default marriage. The consequence is that, at the dissolution of the relationship, the assets or any obligations are determined or distributed on a basis of the arrangement that parties used during their relationship,” he said.

Domestic partnerships were never prohibited in South African law – but neither did they enjoy any noteworthy recognition or protection, Preller said.

“In SA, marriage laws traditionally provided parties with a variety of legal protections. These laws governed what happened to the property of the parties during the marriage and on dissolution, either by divorce or death, and also meant that certain benefits were automatically acquired, such as membership of medical aid funds, pension funds, etc.

“Married spouses also had a reciprocal duty of support under the common law.”

Preller said South African courts had occasionally helped couples by deciding that an express or implied universal partnership existed, but this was usually difficult to prove.

“The only way to be protected in our law is to enter into a cohabitation agreement. Such an agreement clarifies the expectations of the partners and also serves as an early warning of future problems.

“A cohabitation agreement will determine what would happen to the property and assets of the couple if they should decide to separate. The agreement is, however, not enforceable in so far as third parties are concerned.”

However, in terms of the 2005 Children’s Act, the parents of children born out of wedlock had a duty to maintain their offspring, “irrespective of the living arrangements”, Preller said.

“Basically a cohabitation agreement regulates rights and duties between the partners.

“It could almost be compared to an antenuptial contract entered into prior to the conclusion of a civil marriage.

“The agreement can provide for the division and distribution of assets upon dissolution: for instance, the formal agreement may set out the rights and obligations towards each other; the respective financial contributions to the joint home; clarify arrangements regarding ownership of property that they may purchase jointly and the division of their jointly owned assets should they separate,” said Preller.

“An agreement such as this will be legally binding as long as it contains no provisions that are immoral or illegal.

“If there is no agreement on the dissolution of a domestic partnership agreement, a party would only be entitled to retain those assets which he or she has purchased and owns and further would be entitled to share in the assets proportionately in terms of the contribution which they have made to the partnership.”

Preller said, however, that problems arose if a partner tried to enforce a domestic partnership agreement if the partner being sued was married to someone else.

“It has been argued that in such cases domestic partnership agreements violate public policy to the extent that they impair the community of property rights (where applicable) of the lawful married spouse.”

He said the Domestic Partnerships Bill was still being formulated, and it wasn’t clear how it would be implemented.

“In the current constitutional dispensation it is unlikely that a partner will be left in despair, taking into account the Domestic Partnerships Bill,” Preller said.

Fiona Renton, head of the legal services department at financial and risk services provider Alexander Forbes, said: “My advice would be for cohabiting couples to enter into a contract – a written partnership agreement that states exactly what will happen in the event of death or a split, protecting their rights and outlining their obligations.

“For example, when it comes to the ownership of property, the contract should state what happens to ownership of the property (such as one spouse buying out the other) or payments in the event of death or a split.

“Putting any relationship into writing is always helpful, even if it’s just adding someone on your medical aid as a dependant.

“Having said that, in the event of death, having a will is always the best idea.

“Out of the bounds of a legally recognised marriage there is no intestate succession – meaning there is no automatic participation in the estate to make sure the other partner is looked after.”

Joint accounts never a good idea

Money is one of the most important matters a couple needs to resolve when contemplating living together or marriage, according to Sugendhree Reddy, director of banking products at Standard Bank.

“One issue that often comes up in these kinds of discussions is whether to have a joint bank account. In many ways, this can seem like an appealing option.

“However, most financial experts don’t recommend having a joint account at all. We never encourage a joint account because whether you are married or living together, you both need to grow your assets and get a good credit rating. Having a joint account invariably makes it difficult for one of the partners to do so. Besides, a joint bank account puts one partner at great risk in the event of a break-up, death or financial difficulties.”

Reddy said there was no joint bank account with two equal account holders. “A ‘joint’ account is actually an account in one person’s name, to which the other person is a signatory. This causes a number of complications for that signatory. The most important of these is that without a bank account in your name, you will have no credit record at the bank – which makes it difficult to get credit at shops, open a cellphone account or apply for a loan.”

In the event of a break-up, Reddy said, the joint account could be emptied by one partner or the person in whose name the bank account is held could remove the second signatory.

If one partner dies, “banks tend to freeze the account until the estate is resolved – leaving the signatory partner with no access to the funds for an extended time”, said Reddy.

Reddy advises couples to split responsibility for monthly expenses, or open an account for the household into which both pay a portion of their salaries for general expenses.

Who gets your pension?

There are typically two types of benefits payable to “spouses”, says Fiona Renton, head of legal services at Alexander Forbes.

“Firstly pensions, which are payable to those who qualify as spouses – and that would depend on how each fund defines an ‘eligible spouse’: people must check the fund rules to see if their partner/spouse would qualify.

“Fund rules may stipulate that you must be married to the same person at date of retirement and date of death for them to qualify for a spouse’s pension. This prevents so-called ‘death-bed marriages’ where a pensioner marries someone much younger than them after they have already retired – and on their death the fund realises that there is a much younger spouse to whom they have a liability to pay a pension for many years.”

The second benefit type is the typical fund benefit (fund credit or share of fund) plus an insured multiple of a salary (three times annual salary, for example).

“This is allocated by the trustees, to your dependants and nominees.

“A dependant includes a spouse; the Pension Funds Act defines a spouse as ‘a person who is the permanent life partner or spouse or civil union partner of a member in accordance with the Marriage Act, Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, Civil Union Act or the tenets of a religion. A very wide definition.”

To ensure that no partner is overlooked, the pension fund member should always nominate a beneficiary in the relevant form to help the trustees – although trustees are not absolutely bound to follow that nomination, said Renton.

“Unfortunately, when it comes to death and money such decisions by fund trustees are often contested.”

No maintenance for a sacked lover

Not so long ago I wrote an article about the fact that in South African law there is in fact no such thing as a common law marriage and that partners that cohabitates or live together in a domestic partnership will in fact have no right to claim maintenance from one another. In fact, this was exactly what the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled this week in the matter of McDonald v Young (292/10) [2011] ZASCA 31 on 24 March 2011.

The facts of this case were as follows.

The parties were involved in a relationship and had cohabited, as man and wife, for approximately seven years from June 1999 until May 2006. After the relationship broke down, the appellant instituted an action against the respondent in the Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) for an order declaring that a joint venture agreement existed between the parties in respect of immovable property (the property) situate at Port Island, Port St Francis, in the Eastern Cape, alternatively, for an order that the respondent pay maintenance to the appellant. The high court (Veldhuizen J) found that the appellant had failed to prove the existence of a joint venture agreement and, in respect of the maintenance claim, that there was no duty on the respondent to support the appellant. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court with the leave of the high court.

The issues on appeal, as in the high court, wer whether the appellant has established the existence of a joint venture agreement between the parties, alternatively, whether the respondent is under a duty (by operation of law, or alternatively, by virtue of a tacit contract) to support the appellant subsequent to their cohabitation.

Shortly after the parties were introduced to each other the appellant took up residence with the respondent at her farm in Knysna. The appellant’s main business interest was the promotion and marketing of surfing and surfboard products. During 1999, the appellant and his Durban-based brother had been in the process of establishing a new business, Inter Surf Africa Exporters (ISAE), which was involved in the manufacture and export of surfboards. The appellant did not possess any meaningful assets and had very limited income. The respondent, on the other hand, was a woman of considerable means. She had an annual cash income in excess of R1,3m and possessed substantial assets. When the appellant and the respondent met, they were 59 and 54 years of age, respectively. It was common cause that the appellant had not been in receipt of a regular income and had, for a time, during the course of the relationship, received a monthly allowance from the respondent.

The appellant’s claim to a half-share in the property was based on an express oral joint venture agreement concluded by the parties. The appellant testified that the terms of the agreement were that the respondent would contribute financially to the acquisition, completion and refurbishment of the property while the appellant would contribute his time and expertise to oversee the development of the property. According to the appellant, it was agreed that they would each share jointly in the property. The appellant testified that the primary objective of the agreement was to ensure that he gained financial independence. Despite the fact that the property was to have been registered in both their names, it was subsequently agreed, according to him, that the property would be registered in the respondent’s name for tax purposes. It was common cause that the initial written agreement had reflected both their names as purchasers of the property.

It was contended, on behalf of the appellant, that the high court had erred in failing to accept and rely on the appellant’s evidence regarding the agreement, having particular regard to the fact that his evidence was unchallenged. It was further contended that the respondent’s failure to testify was fatal to her case and that this court was obliged to accept his unchallenged evidence in respect of both the agreement and the claim for maintenance.

In our law it is settled that uncontradicted evidence is not necessarily acceptable or sufficient to discharge an onus. In Kentz (Pty) Ltd v Power, Cloete J undertook a careful review of relevant cases where this principle was endorsed and applied. The learned judge pointed out that the most succinct statement of the law in this regard is to be found in Siffman v Kriel, where Innes CJ said:

‘It does not follow, because evidence is uncontradicted, that therefore it is true . . . The story told by the person on whom the onus rests may be so improbable as not to discharge it.’

It was thus necessary to consider the appellant’s evidence in detail. It was clear from the judgment of the high court that it was mindful that the appellant’s evidence, in order to be reliable, had to be credible. The high court, on the evidence, reached the conclusion that the respondent had ‘initially intended that the contract should reflect the [appellant] as one of the purchasers’. However, it did not accept his evidence in its entirety and went on to find that the appellant had failed to prove the existence of a joint venture agreement.

In the Judge’s view, there were a number of unsatisfactory aspects in the appellant’s evidence. It was significant noted by the court how the appellant’s claim against the respondent has developed over time. During May 2006 and shortly after the parties parted ways, they met, in the presence of their respective attorneys, with a view to settle the disputes between them. The appellant’s evidence regarding the claim he had advanced at that meeting, was as follows:

‘So the idea was to try and settle the split between yourself and Mrs Young? — I accept ─ I looked at it like that because it did look like we weren’t going to get together again, so I assumed that that was the reason.

And what were your claims that day? — My claims that day with regards to my share of Port St Francis, with regards to my contribution I had made over the seven years and discussion on my contract with the bakkie.’

This was in stark contrast to his testimony in the magistrate’s court to the effect that he had, at the time of the meeting, been under the impression that he did not have a claim against the respondent and that the claim had ‘materialised some time afterwards when I . . . approached some attorneys for advice’. The appellant’s explanation for the contradiction, that he had meant to convey that he had not yet ‘implemented’ his claim, is, in my view, unsatisfactory. The very purpose of the meeting was an attempt to resolve the dispute between himself and the respondent without the need to resort to litigation.

On 17 July 2006, and following upon the May 2006 meeting, the appellant’s attorney wrote a letter to the respondent’s attorney, which was intended to ‘motivate and substantiate’ the appellant’s claim against the respondent ‘as comprehensively as possible’. (The Court’s emphasis.) It was recorded in the letter that the appellant believed that a universal partnership had existed between the parties and that he was entitled to ‘some form of compensation’ (The Court’s emphasis.) for his contribution to the partnership. It is instructive that no mention was made of the appellant’s half-share in the property, despite the fact that the appellant testified that he had given his attorney instructions in this regard and that he (the appellant) had had sight of the letter prior to it being dispatched. The development of the appellant’s claim over time is not without significance.

During the period that the parties were cohabiting, the appellant drafted numerous agreements and proposals, the purpose of which was to define the financial relationship between him and the respondent. On 24 July 2003, the respondent executed a sole agency mandate in terms of which she appointed the appellant as agent to sell the property and undertook to pay a commission of ten per cent to him. It was the appellant’s testimony that the commission he would have earned was to have provided him with financial security. The appellant agreed that he had, during October 2004, drafted an agreement, aimed at resolving the constant disputes he and the respondent had had regarding his financial security. The salient terms of this agreement were that (i) he was appointed as sole agent to sell two properties, including the property which is the subject of this dispute; (ii) he would be paid a commission of ten per cent for securing the sale of the properties; and (iii) the respondent would purchase government retail bonds to the value of R500 000 on behalf of the appellant. It was also his evidence that the relationship between him and the respondent had been particularly volatile at that time and his intention, in drafting this agreement, was to achieve clarification regarding his financial position.

It was surprising that the appellant failed to mention his half-share in the property in the October 2004 proposal. This was even more surprising when regard is had to his evidence that he was at that time concerned, as there was uncertainty regarding his financial future. The wording of this proposal, as well as the agency agreement, excludes the possibility that he had acquired a share in the property. It was in the court’s view extremely improbable that had the parties agreed in 1999 when the property was purchased that they would be joint owners thereof, the appellant would not, in 2004, have recorded his right to, or even a claim for, a half-share in a proposal aimed at settling outstanding matters between him and the respondent.

Counsel for the appellant attached great importance to the fact that the initial agreement had recorded both parties’ names as purchasers. The appellant assumed that both names were inserted on the instructions of the respondent. There was no evidence to support this assumption. Even if such instructions did emanate from the respondent, it does not necessarily follow, as was found by the high court, that this meant that there was an agreement between the parties as alleged by the appellant. The recording of both parties’ names is nothing more than an indicator pointing towards the conclusion of an agreement and it is a factor to be considered in conjunction with the probabilities.

There were a number of factors that support the respondent’s denial of the existence of a joint venture agreement between the parties. These included: the claim as articulated at the meeting with their legal representatives shortly after the break-up, the letter written after that meeting, various agreements drafted by the appellant, and the unsatisfactory and often contradictory evidence given by the appellant. The court mentioned that the appellant contradicted himself on one of the essential terms of the agreement, namely, whether it was agreed that he would be entitled to half of the proceeds of the sale of the property only or the property together with its contents.

The appellant bore the onus of proving the agreement upon which he relied as well as the terms thereof. Having regard to the deficiencies in the appellant’s evidence and the probabilities, it cannot be said that it measures up to the standard required for acceptability in respect of the existence of the joint venture agreement. In Da Mata v Otto NO, Van Blerk JA, dealing with the approach to be adopted when deciding probabilities, said:

‘In regard to the appellant’s sworn statements alleging the oral agreement, it does not follow that because these allegations were not contradicted ─ the only witness who could have disputed them had died ─ they should be taken as proof of the facts involved. Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., vol. VII, p. 260, states that the mere assertion of any witness does not of itself need to be believed, even though he is unimpeached in any manner, because to require such belief would be to give a quantative and impersonal measure to testimony. The learned author in this connection at p. 262 cites the following passage from a decision quoted:

“It is not infrequently supposed that a sworn statement is necessarily proof, and that, if uncontradicted, it established the fact involved. Such is by no means the law. Testimony, regardless of the amount of it, which is contrary to all reasonable probabilities or conceded facts ─ testimony which no sensible man can believe ─ goes for nothing; while the evidence of a single witness to a fact, there being nothing to throw discredit thereon, cannot be disregarded.”’

The appellant’s testimony was contrary to all reasonable probabilities and, despite the fact that it was unchallenged, counts for ‘nothing’. In assessing the probabilities, the conclusion seems to be inescapable that the appellant has not discharged the onus resting on him. It follows that the appellant was not entitled to the relief sought in respect of the main claim.

The court considered the alternative claim for maintenance and dealt first with the argument that such a duty existed by operation of law. In South African law, certain family relationships, such as parent and child and husband and wife, create a duty of support. The common law has been extended in line with the Constitution to protect contractual rights of support in the same way as the common law duty of support. In Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality Intervening), this High Court of Appeal recognised a contractual right to support arising out of a marriage in terms of Islamic law for purposes of a dependant’s action. In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund, the common law action by a spouse, for loss of support against the wrongdoer who unlawfully kills the other spouse, was extended to partners in a same-sex permanent life relationship similar in other respects to marriage, who had tacitly undertaken reciprocal duties of support. The Constitutional Court in Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa & another, found that the common law duty of support, could, in certain circumstances, be extended to persons in a same-sex relationship. Madala J, writing for the court, commented as follows:

‘The law attaches a duty of support to various family relationships, for example, husband and wife, and parent and child. In a society where the range of family formations has widened, such a duty of support may be inferred as a matter of fact in certain cases of persons involved in permanent, same-sex life partnerships. Whether such a duty of support exists or not will depend on the circumstances of each case.’

Counsel for the appellant relied on Kahn, Amod and Du Plessis in support of his contention that a legal duty of support rests on the respondent. This contention was misplaced. In both Amod and Khan, the parties in respect of whom a duty of support had been alleged had been married to each other in terms of Islamic law. The ratio of the court, in both cases, was that the marriage between the parties had given rise to reciprocal contractual duties of support on the part of the parties to that marriage. In Du Plessis, Cloete JA, having had regard to the facts of that matter, concluded that the plaintiff had proved that the deceased had undertaken to support him and that the deceased had owed the plaintiff a contractual duty of support. The learned judge of appeal said:

‘In the present case the case for drawing an inference that the plaintiff and the deceased undertook reciprocal duties of support is even stronger. The plaintiff and the deceased would have married one another if they could have done so. As this course was not open to them, they went through a “marriage” ceremony which was as close as possible to a heterosexual marriage ceremony. The fact that the plaintiff and the deceased went through such a “marriage” ceremony and did so before numerous witnesses gives rise to the inference that they intended to do the best they could to publicise to the world that they intended their relationship to be, and to be regarded as, similar in all respects to that of a heterosexual married couple, ie one in which the parties would have a reciprocal duty of support. That having been their intention, it must be accepted as a probability that they tacitly undertook a reciprocal duty of support to one another.

Further support for this finding is the fact that the plaintiff and the deceased thereafter lived together as if they were legally married in a stable and permanent relationship until the deceased was killed some 11 years later; they were accepted by their family and friends as partners in such a relationship; they pooled their income and shared their family responsibilities; each of them made a will in which the other partner was appointed his sole heir; and when the plaintiff was medically boarded, the deceased expressly stated that he would support the plaintiff financially and in fact did so until he died.’

Amod, Khan and Du Plessis were decided on the basis of contracts entered into by the respective parties, and are not authority for the contention that there is a duty of support, by operation of law, on the respondent to maintain the appellant.

The question whether the relationship between the parties, a heterosexual couple who choose to live together, free from the bonds of matrimony, gives rise to a legal duty of support, could in the Judge’s view, be answered with reference to Volks NO v Robinson & others. In that matter the Constitutional Court was concerned with the interpretation and constitutionality of s 2(1), read with s 1, of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990, which confers on surviving spouses the right to claim maintenance from the estates of their deceased spouses if they are not able to support themselves. The court had to determine whether the exclusion of survivors of permanent life partnerships from the protection of the Act constituted unfair discrimination. Skweyiya J, writing for the majority, referred with approval to the comments made by O’Regan J in Dawood & another v Minister of Home Affairs & others; Shalabi & another v Minister of Home Affairs & others; Thomas & another v Minister of Home Affairs & others that:

‘Marriage and the family are social institutions of vital importance. Entering into and sustaining a marriage is a matter of intense private significance to the parties to that marriage for they make a promise to one another to establish and maintain an intimate relationship for the rest of their lives which they acknowledge obliges them to support one another, to live together and to be faithful to one another.

The institutions of marriage and the family are important social institutions that provide for the security, support and companionship of members of our society and bear an important role in the rearing of children. The celebration of a marriage gives rise to moral and legal obligations, particularly the reciprocal duty of support placed upon spouses and their joint responsibility for supporting and raising children born of the marriage. These legal obligations perform an important social function.’

The Constitutional Court was of the view that the law may distinguish between married people and unmarried people and may, in appropriate circumstances, accord benefits to married people which it does not accord to unmarried people. The learned justice reasoned as follows in para 55:

‘There are a wide range of legal privileges and obligations that are triggered by the contract of marriage. In a marriage the spouses’ rights are largely fixed by law and not by agreement, unlike in the case of parties who cohabit without being married.’

The court found that whilst there was a reciprocal duty of support between married persons, ‘no duty of support arises by operation of law in the case of unmarried cohabitants’. This was an unequivocal statement of the law by the Constitutional Court. Skweyiya J went on to state that to the extent that any obligations arise between cohabitants during the subsistence of their relationship, these arise by agreement and only to the extent of that agreement.

The court also considered whether a contractual duty of support towards the appellant existed. The argument, presented as a second alternative to the claim based on a joint venture, was that the court should find that the parties had entered into a tacit agreement in terms of which the respondent had agreed to support the appellant even after the end of their relationship.

The facts upon which the appellant relies in support of his claim that the respondent had assumed a duty of support towards him are the following:

(i) He and the respondent had lived together as if they were legally married in a stable and permanent relationship;

(ii) The respondent had supported him during the seven-year period that they had resided together and the appellant had been dependent on such support. She had given him an allowance, provided transport for him and paid for entertainment and overseas holidays;

(iii) The respondent had, in a series of wills, made extensive provision for financial support of the appellant in the event of her death;

(iv) The respondent was a wealthy woman while he had no assets and very limited income;

(v) He had contributed to the maintenance of and increase in value of the respondent’s estate, often at the expense of his own business interests; (vi) The appellant was reliant on an income from employment and could not, due to his advanced age, guarantee for how much longer he would be able to earn a living; and

(vii) The respondent had advised the appellant that she had sufficient funds to support both of them.

The argument that the parties had entered into a tacit agreement regarding maintenance cannot be sustained for a number of reasons. First, the reliance on a tacit contract is inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence. The appellant believed and gave evidence to the effect that he and the respondent had concluded an express agreement in respect of the property, the aim of which was to ensure that he was financially independent. Implicit in this is the intention that he would not have to rely on the respondent, or any other person, for financial support. In the circumstances, the appellant could not have formed the intention to contract tacitly with the respondent. Having regard to his evidence that the purpose of the joint venture agreement was to render him financially independent, the appellant could not at the same time have contemplated, that the respondent would continue to support him for the rest of his life. A tacit contract must not extend to more than the parties contemplated. In Rand Trading Co Ltd v Lewkewitsch the parties had erroneously assumed that there was a contract in existence between them. The court did not accept the argument that the company’s conduct in recognising the existence of the lease, paying the rent and otherwise performing in terms of the contract had created a binding contract. Solomon J said:

‘But I think the answer to that argument is a very clear one, and it is this ─ that all these facts are explained on the simple ground that both parties erroneously assumed that there was a contract in existence between them . . . And the mere fact . . . that both parties erroneously assumed that there was a contract in existence at that date altogether precludes us from now inferring a new contract.’

The appellant’s stated belief, that there was an express contract between him and the respondent in respect of the property, precludes this court from drawing an inference to the effect that the parties had entered into a tacit agreement the terms of which were inconsistent with the express agreement to which he testified. It was not open for the appellant to contend that if the court disbelieved his evidence that a joint venture agreement had been concluded, the court should infer from the proved facts that a tacit contract had come into existence, because such an inference cannot be drawn where it would conflict with what he said was the actual position. A litigant can plead, but not testify, in the alternative.

Secondly, the appellant’s evidence was that the respondent’s attitude had always been that in the event that their relationship ended, he would receive no financial benefit from her. This conduct, on the part of the respondent, is inconsistent with a tacit agreement to support the appellant. The appellant’s explanation for drafting the various proposals regarding the financial relationship between him and the respondent was as follows:

‘Well, the motivation behind it at that particular time, we were going through quite a patchy period; we were arguing and not agreeing on a lot of things. And it appeared to me that all of a sudden my situation could alter and I’d be left standing high and dry. And I discussed it with Lesley [the respondent] and I felt that if we had something in writing, and if that did occur at least I had something to fall back on . . . ’. (Emphasis added.)

It is trite that a tacit contract is established by conduct. In order to establish a tacit contract, the conduct of the parties must be such that it justifies an inference that there was consensus between them. There must be evidence of conduct which justifies an inference that the parties intended to, and did, contract on the terms alleged. It is clear from the appellant’s evidence that there was no consensus between the parties. The appellant, on his own testimony, was uncertain about his financial future. He realised that he would only be entitled to what had been agreed between the parties, hence his desire to have a written contract ‘to fall back on’. The respondent’s attitude, as testified to by the appellant, that he would leave the relationship without any financial benefit, is an indicator that she had not, tacitly or otherwise, agreed to support the appellant. I am not satisfied that this court can conclude, from all the relevant proven facts and circumstances, that a tacit contract, in terms of which the respondent undertook to financially maintain the appellant, for as long as he needed such maintenance, came into existence.

For those reasons, the appellant’s maintenance claim which is premised on a legal, alternatively, a contractual duty, failed.

Bertus Preller is a Divorce and Family Law Attorney in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in law and 13 years as a practising attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters and international divorce law.