Is a husband obliged to pay maintenance when his wife lives with another man?

 

A recent judgment concerned the issue whether a husband is obliged to pay maintenance to his former wife, who is involved in a relationship with another man, after divorce. The plaintiff issued summons against the defendant, her husband, during 2003, for a decree of divorce, maintenance for herself and their son and ancillary relief.

The parties had not lived together as man and wife for a continuous period of at least two years prior to the date of the institution of the divorce action. In terms of the provision of s 4(2)(a) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 (the Divorce Act), this is proof of the irretrievable break-down of the marriage. The remaining issues were whether the plaintiff is entitled to maintenance, and if so, what such maintenance should be. The defendant’s case in respect of the plaintiff’s entitlement to maintenance was that it is against public policy that a woman should be supported by two men.

The maintenance post-divorce Section 7(1) and (2) of the Act sets out when a court may order the payment of maintenance and the factors that should be taken into account when making such determination.

It provides as follows:

‘7(1) A Court granting a decree of divorce may in accordance with a written agreement between the parties make an order with regard to the division of the assets of the parties or the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other.

(2) In the absence of an order made in terms of subsection (1) with regard to the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other, the Court may, having regard to the existing or prospective means of each of the parties, their respective earning capacities, financial needs and obligations, the age of each of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce, their conduct insofar as it may be relevant to the break-down of the marriage, an order in terms of subsection (3) and any other factor which in the opinion of the court should be taken into account, make an order which the court finds just in respect of the payment of maintenance by the one party to the other for any period until the death or remarriage of the party in whose favour the order is given, whichever event may first occur.’

Through a long line of cases dealing exclusively with maintenance pendente lite, it has become customary not to award maintenance to a spouse who is living in a permanent relationship with another.

In Drummond v Drummond the Appellate Division agreed with the definition of the phrase ‘living as husband and wife’ as stated by the full bench. The parties agreed that the husband would pay maintenance towards the wife and that maintenance would ‘cease should the plaintiff prove that the defendant was living as man and wife with a third person on a permanent basis’. The said phrase has the following meaning: ‘. . . the main components of a modus vivendi akin to that of husband and wife are, firstly, living under the same roof, secondly, establishing, maintaining and contributing to a joint household, and thirdly maintaining an intimate relationship.’ The plaintiff and S clearly live together as husband and wife according to the said definition.

In Cohen v Cohen the parties determined in a deed of settlement that the maintenance payable by the plaintiff (the husband) would cease if the defendant lived with another man as husband and wife for a certain specified period. This order was varied by a maintenance court in respect of the amounts the husband had to pay towards maintenance. In the maintenance court’s order the condition in respect of the cohabitation was left out. In a subsequent action it was decided that, where the magistrate had left out the said clause, the condition was no longer enforceable as it had been substituted by the maintenance court.

In Carstens v Carstens the wife claimed maintenance pendente lite in a rule 43 application while she lived with another man as husband and wife. Mullins J found: ‘It is in my view against public policy that a woman should be entitled to claim maintenance pendente lite from her husband when she is flagrantly and deliberately living as man and wife with another man. Not only is applicant in the present case living in adultery, but she and her lover are maintaining a joint household complete with the addition of an adulterine child. She has by her conduct accepted the support of Clarkson in lieu of that of her husband. The fact that Clarkson is unable to support her to the extent that she may have been accustomed in her matrimonial home with respondent does not appear to me to affect the position.’

In SP v HP (another rule 43 application) it was found, on the strength of Carstens, that ‘(t)he objection is not so much about the moral turpitude attaching to the illicit cohabitation, but more about the notion of a woman being supported by two men at the same time’.

In the unreported judgment of Qonqo v Qonqo dealing with a rule 43 application for maintenance pendente lite, the court, in spite of the fact that the applicant cohabited with her lover, ordered the respondent to pay maintenance pendente lite. The reason for ordering the payment of maintenance was that there was no proof that the lover supported the applicant in that instance.

It is also clear from the wording of s 7(2) of the Divorce Act that the legislature did not determine that maintenance should cease when the person receiving the maintenance is in a relationship akin to a marriage but only on remarriage. It is usually by way of an agreement between the parties that the additional condition relating to the cessation of payment of maintenance on the cohabitation with a third party is added.

Marriage entails that the parties establish and ‘maintain an intimate relationship for the rest of their lives which they acknowledge obliges them to support one another, to live together and to be faithful to one another’. One of the effects of marriage is the reciprocal duty of support. This duty of support does not exist, in circumstances such as these, if there is no marriage.

In Volks NO v Robinson and Others the proceedings had been initiated by Mrs Robinson who had been a partner in a permanent life partnership with Mr Shandling for a period of 16 years until his death in 2001. The couple had not been married, although there was no legal obstacle to their marriage. Following the death of Shandling, Robinson submitted a claim for maintenance against his deceased estate. The executor of the estate, Volks, rejected her claim because she was not ‘a survivor’ as contemplated by the Act. Skweyiya J said at paras 55 – 56: ‘Mrs Robinson never married the late Mr Shandling. There is a fundamental difference between her position and spouses or survivors who are predeceased by their husbands. Her relationship with Mr Shandling is one in which each was free to continue or not, and from which each was free to withdraw at will, without obligation and without legal or other formalities. There are a wide range of legal privileges and obligations that are triggered by the contract of marriage. In a marriage the spouse’s rights are largely fixed by law and not by agreement, unlike in the case of parties who cohabit without being married. The distinction between married and unmarried people cannot be said to be unfair when considered in the larger context of the rights and obligations uniquely attached to marriage. Whilst there is a reciprocal duty of support between married persons, no duty of support arises by operation of law in the case of unmarried cohabitants. The maintenance benefit in section 2(1) of the Act falls within the scope of the maintenance support obligation attached to marriage. The Act applies to persons in respect of whom the deceased person (spouse) would have remained legally liable for maintenance, by operation of law, had he or she not died.’

If regard is had to the decision of Cohen, that it cannot be read into s 7(2) of the Act that the maintenance will cease when the recipient of the maintenance lives as husband and wife with another, as an express agreement to that effect can be amended by the maintenance court. Having regard to the factors that should be taken into account when determining whether the defendant ought to pay maintenance for the plaintiff, in terms of s 7(2) of the Act, the factors mentioned are not exclusive.

When taking into consideration the factors mentioned in s 7(2) of the Act to determine whether the defendant is liable to pay maintenance the following emerge:

(a) The existing and prospective means of each of the parties and the parties’ respective earning capacities.

(b) The financial needs and obligations of the parties. It is clear that neither of the parties can live lavishly, but they are not destitute.

(c) The age of the parties.

(d) The duration of the marriage.

(e) The standard of living of the parties prior to the divorce.

(f) The conduct of the defendant insofar as it may be relevant to the breakdown of the marriage.

The facts of this matter differed materially from Carstens; SP v HP; and Qonqo. It is immaterial whether the defendant was unable to support the plaintiff and their son, or whether he was merely unwilling to do so. Other legislation also makes it clear that the legislature envisaged that a man can be supported by two women. In terms of the provisions s 8(4) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, a court dissolving a customary marriage has the powers contemplated in ss 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. This has the effect that with polygamous customary marriages a husband will have the right to be supported by more than one wife, post-divorce, if circumstances demand it. Although it might have been a concept that was unacceptable in a previous dispensation, the concept is not unacceptable today. The court was of of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case it could not be said that it is against public policy that the defendant should be liable to pay maintenance to the plaintiff; there is no legislative prohibition and the court found that there was no general public policy to that effect or moral prohibition.

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When billionaires divorce

When dealing with high net worth and multimillionaires divorce matters a divorce attorney must make sure to employ the best possible experts as part of the legal team, this is especially so if the assets at stake run into millions. I was involved as the divorce attorney of a client in a recent matter where two British citizens divorced in South Africa with assets across the globe that ran into millions of rands. In matters such as these various expert witnesses may be employed to lead evidence on behalf of a party to the divorce proceedings, consisting of forensic auditors, valuers, art experts, industrial psychologists, child psychologists, immigration experts etc.

In this matter I was fortunate to work with one of Britton’s top leading Family Law Barristers Richard Todd QC who rendered an opinion on the division of the matrimonial assets in this divorce case as far as it relates to UK law. Richard is an Oxford scholar who won the Hugh Bellott Prize (Highest Placed in the Oxford University Public International Law Finals) and who obtained the highest awards available to a practising Silk: The Chambers & Partners “Family Law Silk of the Year “ and The Lawyer’s “Hottest Family Law QC”. Richard have given expert evidence of English law to the courts of Australia, Belgium, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands, Cyprus, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, India, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain and the USA and appeared in over 4000 matrimonial cases with a long list of report cases, needless to say the identity of former clients is confidential. However former clients include twelve Billionaires (Sterling) and two Oscar winning actors (plus another three who have been nominated).

In this matter the parties were married in England and subsequently immigrated to South Africa. In such a case the matrimonial property regime of England would apply to their marriage and English law would always apply to their marriage. In a case such as this and where the divorce is contested a South African court could divorce them but, the court would have to apply English Law. It is interesting to note that if a South African couple is on holiday in England and decides to get married, they would automatically marry in community of property and not according to English law.

The test is the husband’s domicile as at the date of the marriage, i.e. what country the husband considered to be his permanent home plus his mental intention to remain there indefinitely. Domicile is defined as the principal place of residence of an individual. This is determined primarily by intent.

Thus, if the husband regarded his place of domicile to be Cape Town at the time of the marriage, the parties would be married according to the laws of South Africa and not England and their type of marriage (matrimonial property regime) would be one in community of property. For the marriage to have been out of community of property, the parties would have had to enter into an antenuptial contract in South Africa before leaving for holiday. If they failed to do so, they would have to apply to court to register an antenuptial contract, postnuptially.

About the author:

Bertus Preller is a Divorce Attorney in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in most sectors of the law and 13 years as a practicing attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times and magazines such as Noseweek, You and Huisgenoot, and also appeared on SABC television on the 3 Talk TV show. His clients include artists, celebrities, sports people and high networth individuals. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters, international divorce law, digital rights, media law and criminal law.

Email: bertus(@)divorceattorney.co.za

Bekende Egskeidings Prokureur Gee Raad

Dit is belangrik om die implikasies van die wyse waarop jy getroud is te verstaan, en as jy dit nie verstaan nie, vind dan uit by iemand wat aan jou kan verduidelik sodat jy dit behoorlik kan verstaan. Is jy getroud binne of buite gemeenskap van goedere? As jy is getroud binne gemeenskap van goedere, sal jy geregtig wees op 50% van die gemeenskaplike boedel en as jy is getroud buite gemeenskap van goedere met die aanwasbedeling, is jy geregtig op die helfte van die verskil van jou en jou gade se aanwas. As jy getroud is buite gemeenskap van goedere sonder die aanwasbedeling voor 1 November 1984, sal jy geregtig wees om te vra vir ‘n herverdeling van die bates, wat behels dat jy dalk in staat sal wees om 50% van die gesamentlike bates te eis, maar as jy getroud buite gemeenskap van goedere sonder die aanwasbedeling na 1 November 1984 sal jy net ‘n eis vir onderhoud kan instel onder sekere omstandighede.

  • Jy kan onder sekere omstandighede eis vir rehabiliterende onderhoud. Rehabiliterende onderhoud is waar een gade die ander vir ‘n vasgestelde tydperk maandeliks betaal, bv vir twee jaar of langer.
  • Onthou dat jy kan ‘n aansoek loods hangende die egskeiding om onderhoud, terwyl die egskeiding nog nie afgehandel is nie, in so ‘n aansoek kan jy ook eis dat jou gade ‘n bydrae maak tot jou regskoste.
  • Kry soveel finansiële inligting oor jou eggenoot moontlik, maak afskrifte van alle bankstate, kredietkaart state en maak ‘n lys van al die bates en laste, bronne van inkomste, ens.
  • Stel ‘n volledige begroting op van jou huidige maandelikse uitgawes en inkomste van jou en jou kinders. Dit kan die moeite werd wees om voorsiening te maak vir toekomstige uitgawes.
  • Jy kan ook aandring op die sessie van ‘n lewenspolis van jou gade om die betaling van maandelikse onderhoud te verseker.
  • Probeer om aan te bly in die gesamentlike woning vir solank as jy kan huis (as dit naby aan jou kinders se skool of werk is). Daar is ‘n gesegde in ons reg, dat besit 9 / 10 van die reg is. Om in die gesamentlike woning aan te bly, sal ook die situasie van die kinders stabiliseer, aangesien ‘n trek na ‘n nuwe bestemming ‘n baie traumatiese ervaring vir die kinders kan wees.
  • Onthou dat jy nie noodwendig die oordragkoste hoef te betaal vir ‘n eiendom wat aan jou oorgedra word in jou egskeiding nie. Daar is verskeie opsies met betrekking tot eiendom wat aan beide van julle behoort, byvoorbeeld deur dit te behou of te verkoop of die netto wins verdeel.
  • Sien toe dat die Skikkingsooreenkoms so opgestel word dat jy kan aandring op ‘n aftrekking van jou gade se salaris indien hy nie betaal nie.
  • Sorg dat jou egskeiding Skikkingsooreenkoms sou opgestel word om ‘n deel van enige bates wat jou eggenoot wegsteek en waarvan jy nie bewus is op datum van die egskeiding nie te bekom wanneer jy later daarvan uitvind.
  • Moet nie minder tevrede wees nie, baie vroue loop eenvoudig as gevolg van die emosionele druk met minder as waarop hulle geregtig is. Onthou dat egskeiding altyd ‘n sake-besluit is en die besluite wat jy maak nou ‘n definitiewe impak sal hê later in jou lewe.
  • Egskeiding kan ‘n langdurige proses wees en dit kan baie frustrerend en emosioneel dreinerend wees, dit neem tyd en strategiese beplanning.
  • Moenie verander prokureurs in die proses bloot as gevolg van jou eie frustrasie nie, soos hulle sê, die spel van ‘n egskeiding is soos’ n skaakspel.
  • Onthou dat jou eggenoot se bates sluit ook in aandeelhoudings in maatskappye, aftreefondse, pensioenfondse en selfs belasting terugbetalings.
  • Dink met jou kop en nie met jou hart.
  • Onthou om jou testament te verander.

Relocation of parents with children, you need the consent of the other parent

Relocation of parents to another province, town or country

Relocation disputes between parents are frequent in our courts. Relocation can involve relocation to another town, province or country.  Where both parents have guardianship it necessarily follows that consent from both parents will be needed when one parent decide to relocate with a minor child. It is important to note that there is no section in the Children’s Act that deals specifically with relocation.  The closest that the Children’s Act gets to relocation is section 45 that deals with the jurisdiction of the court in matters where a child is removed from the Republic of South Africa.

Typically a relocation dispute will arise where one parent, normally the parent of primary residence and with whom the child usually resides decides to leave the country or the province to live elsewhere. It then usually follows that the parent who is left behind refuses or disagrees to give consent that the child leaves with the other parent. Once the other parent disagrees or refuses to give consent, the primary caregiver can approach the High Court for an order dispensing with the other parent’s consent and remove the child to another country or province. It must be noted that it is not a given that the court will automatically give its consent.  The reason therefore is that the Children’s Act does not set criteria and our courts have to consider various facts and case law before it will grant an order to the other parent to move the child.

If one has regards to previous case law it is clear that our courts will only grant permission based on the best interests of the child. An important factor that the court will take into consideration is whether the decision by the parent to relocate is reasonable and bona fide and this will be part of the valuation whether the move will be in the child’s best interests. If the court does find that the plan is reasonable then obviously the court will allow the parent to move the child.  It is evident to note that our courts have taken a pragmatic approach and although the move may be to the detriment of the other parent who will have less contact with the child, life must go on.  Another issue that comes into play is the fact that our courts have to respect the freedom of movement of family life of relocating parents.

The following passage from the case F v F 2006 (3) SA 42 (CA) is of importance:

It is an unfortunate reality of marital breakdown that the former spouses must go their separate ways and reconstruct their lives in a manner that each chooses alone

 A court must however also consider the impact that the relocation will have on the other parent who will be left behind. In looking at what is in the best interests of the child, a court should also look at whether relocation will be compatible with the child’s welfare. In F v F as sited above the court stressed the importance that it had to evaluate, weigh and balance a myriad of competing factors, including the child’s wishes in appropriate cases. In this matter the court rejected the mother’s application to relocate with her daughter despite finding that the decision to leave was bona fide. What the court found was that the practicalities of her decision to move were ill-researched and were outweighed by the child’s need not to be separated from either parent.

In the case of MK v RK case number 17189/08 in the South Gauteng High Court, the court followed a similar approach as in F v F. In this matter the child was living with the father. Here the court found that the father was thwarting attempts by the mother to rebuild her relationship with her daughter. The issues between the parties were acrimonious and the father alleged that the mother sexually abused the daughter years ago, based on these and various other factors, the court awarded custody to the father at the time the parties divorced and the child lived for several years with her father. The father then sought to relocate to Israel, although the mother initially gave her consent because she believed that she would be allowed contact with her child. She did however later withdraw her consent when she realised that this will never materialise. The court refused the relocation based on the fact that the father could not provide sufficient information when and where he would be employed, where the child would be going to school and how she would be assisted to learn Hebrew. The court also placed emphasis on the fact that it was important for the child to re-establish her relationship with her mother. What was also interesting in this case was that the court criticized the experts (psychologists) who recommended the relocation based on the fact that they did not considered all the facts and moreover that they did not considered all the evidence in making such far-reaching recommendations.

Another interesting case was that of HG v CG 2010 (3) SA 352 (ECP). This matter concerned four children whose parents were divorced. The eldest was then aged eleven and his siblings, a set of eight year old triplets, comprising two boys and a girl. In terms of the settlement agreement the parents were awarded joint custody. The intention being that the children would spend an equal amount of time with each parent and the children were spending alternate weeks with each parent.

Three years after the divorce the wife approached the High Court by way of an urgent application for variation of the custody order. In the application she sought an order declaring her the primary care provider of the children as well as the authority to permanently remove them from South Africa to Dubai to live with a new man whom she planned to marry.

Experts commissioned by the applicant, being a social worker and clinical psychologist, recommended that the applicant be the primary care provider and that she relocate with the children to Dubai as proposed. Experts not commissioned by her held a different view, finding that relocation would not be in the best interest of the children as they would miss their father, school friends and the city of Port Elizabeth to which they were accustomed. The mother’s application was dismissed and the court did not consent to the relocation as it found that it was not in the best interests of the children.

About the author:

Bertus Preller is a Divorce and Family Law Attorney in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in most sectors of the law and 13 years as a practicing attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. in Cape Town. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times. His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried father’s rights, domestic violence matters, international divorce law, digital rights, media law and criminal law.

The divorce rate amongst celebrities

Nearly 50% of Americans divorce at some point of time in their lives, but somehow we always hope the happily-ever after continues from the reel life to real life for our celebrities too. But by celebrity standards, year 2011 already seems to have a reached a nadir.

The break-ups number more than a dozen this year. Long time sweet-hearts Chalize Theron and Stuart Townsend split after nine-years of togetherness.

Sandra Bullock got bit by the Oscar curse and divorced husband Jesse James. The ball kept on rolling with Kate Winslet separating from husband Sam Mendes.

The list so far includes the divorces of Jennifer Lopez and Marc Anthony, Daniel Baldwin and Joanne Clare Baldwin, Maria Shriver and Arnold Schwarzenegger, Brad Womack and Emily Maynard, Elizabeth Hurley and Arun Nayar, Cheryl and Ashley Cole, Tiger Woods and Elle Nordegren, Courtney Cox and David Arquette, Al Gore and Tipper, Halle Berry and Gabriel Aubry, George Lopez and wife Ann, Jim Carrey and Jenny McCarthy, Kelsey Grammar and wife, and Christina Aguilera and Jordan Bratman.

The US has the world’s highest marriage rate of 9.8 per 1000 as well as the world’s highest divorce rate of 4.95 per 1000.

In a recent study done on Golden Globe award winners revealed that of the celebrities who had been married, the average number of marriages was 1.4, while the average number of divorces was 0.65. The probability of a famous union surviving is only 35 percent, so the odds are 1.9 to 1 against the marriage.

Celebrity marriages are remarkable for their instability. The much-touted 50 percent failure rate for American marriages soars as one’s star rises. The divorce rate among celebrities may be as high as 80 percent, according to Raul Felder a celebrity divorce lawyer in the United States who has represented Rudy Giuliani, Robin Givens, Carol Channing, David Merrick, Riddick Bowe, the former Mrs. Carl Sagan, the former Mrs. Tom Clancy, the former Mrs. Patrick Ewing, and the former Mrs. Martin Scorsese.

An article based on interviews of divorce lawyers in the United States reveals that the most common factors for celebrity divorces are that one of the couple moves up or trades up in movie biz parlance, addiction of some kind, waning of stardom, public infidelity and narcissism.

The most expensive celebrity split was that of Rupert Murdoch, who we will remember as the owner of the now infamous News of the World Newspaper when he divorce from wife Anna where he paid up $1.7 billion to her. Guy Ritchie and Madonna divorce cost $76 million, Tiger Woods- Elle Nordegren have reportedly settled for an estimated $750 million.

If somebody adds up all the expenses on marriages and divorces of celebrities the world over, it surely might even exceed the gross national income of a fairly mid-sized nation like South Africa.

Rights and obligations of unmarried fathers – a court should never be biased

Rights and obligations of unmarried fathers

The facts in FS v JJ and Another 2011 (3) SA 126 (SCA) were as follows. A child, C, was born while the appellant, the father, and her mother, who died shortly after her birth, were living together. They intended to marry. The first respondent was C’s maternal grandmother, who was married to the second respondent (the grandparents). The father and grandparents had been engaged in a protracted battle for the custody of C, during which several applications were heard in the Northern and Western Cape High Courts. The present appeal was against a series of orders made by Kgomo JP in the Northern Cape High Court in terms of which custody of C was awarded to the grandparents – an order at odds with the other orders made by both the Northern and Western Cape High Courts.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was asked to determine, inter alia, the best interests of C, the rights of unmarried fathers, and the extent of grandparents’ rights in respect of their grandchildren.

As to the grandparents’ rights and responsibilities, the court held that these were from 1 April 2010 governed by ss 23 and 24 of the Children’s Act, which governed non-parental rights to care and guardianship. Before then, grandparents had no inherent rights or responsibilities and it was only the High Court that could confer access, custody or guardianship on a grandparent if it was in the best interests of a child, which had to be assessed in the light of the rights of the biological parents.

As far as the father’s allegation of bias by the trial court was concerned, the present court held that it was clear from the conduct and language of Kgomo JP that he was biased against the father and that he had entirely failed to consider C’s best interests. Kgomo JP’s decision in ordering that C be returned to her grandparents had no basis in fact or in law, evinced bias on his part, and failed to consider the only real issue – C’s best interests.

It was clear from the various reports studied by the court that C’s best interests would be served by placing her with her father.

The High Court is the guardian of all children. However at times as seen in this case, the court was biased against the father of the child. One hears allot of father’s complain of a biased attitude that prevails in our courts. Ultimately the only issue that a court should pronounce on is whether its decision is in the best interests of the child. The interests of the parties should always be secondary to that of the child and the court as guardian of all minors should always live up to such expectation.

About the author:

Bertus Preller is a Family Law and Divorce Attorney based in Cape Town and has more than 20 years experience in most sectors of the law and 13 years as a practicing attorney. He specializes in Family law and Divorce Law at Abrahams and Gross Attorneys Inc. and deals with Family and Divorce matters across the country. Bertus is also the Family Law expert on Health24.com and on the expert panel of Law24.com and is frequently quoted on Family Law issues in newspapers such as the Sunday Times and Business Times. His clients include celebrities, actors and actresses, sportsmen and sportswomen, television presenters and various high net worth individuals.  His areas of expertise are Divorce Law, Family Law, International Divorce Law, Divorce Mediation, Parenting Plans, Parental Responsibilities and Rights, Custody (care and contact) of children, same sex marriages, unmarried fathers rights, domestic violence matters, digital rights, media law and criminal law.